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1. Introduction 
The relationship between fiscal decentralisation and 
economic growth is an important but highly controversial 
issue. Increased revenue autonomy for the Scottish 
Parliament is seen by many as a key tool to improve the 
performance of the Scottish economy – see for example, 
Hallwood and MacDonald (2006) and Steel (2006). In 
contrast, others such as Ashcroft et al. (2006) are 
concerned about the possible economic and political risks 
involved and have argued strongly against such a move. 
 
This paper contributes to this discussion by providing an 
objective evaluation of the existing theory and evidence on 
the link between fiscal decentralisation and economic 
growth and its relevance to the Scottish case
1
. 
 
Our interpretation of the literature in respect of improving 
economic growth is that it fails to deliver a clear outcome 
either in favour of or against greater revenue autonomy for 
the Scottish Parliament. Overall, the evidence on the 
relationship between fiscal decentralisation and economic 
growth is mixed. On the positive side, the literature 
identifies a number of avenues through which fiscal 
decentralisation can assist economic development such as 
exploiting dynamic allocative efficiencies and encouraging 
public sector efficiency. However, theory also alludes to 
potential negative effects from possible increased 
macroeconomic instability, regional inequalities, distortion 
of market forces and high administrative costs. As we 
demonstrate, the lack of hard and robust empirical 
evidence from cross-country and single country case 
studies does little to lessen the uncertainty on whether the 
positive or negative effects dominate. 
 
 
In short, increasing the Parliament‟s fiscal powers does 
have the potential to bring significant long-term benefits to 
Scotland‟s economy however, it is important to recognise 
the risks involved. It is also important to be aware that 
while the current devolved fiscal structure has a number of 
advantages, it too suffers from weaknesses. Ultimately, 
recognition of the potential net benefits and an 
understanding of mechanisms whereby these net benefits 
might be secured, or even increased, is an important next 
step for the debate in Scotland. 
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The structure of the paper is as follows. In Section 2 we 
provide an introduction and overview of the concept of 
fiscal decentralisation and seek to clarify the often 
confusing concepts used in the literature. This is essential 
as apparently similar terminology can mean different things 
to different people. In Section 3 we highlight and discuss 
the mechanisms through which fiscal decentralisation can 
impact on economic growth and as we demonstrate, there 
is no single all-encompassing model linking the two. 
Economists have instead identified a number of key 
transmission mechanisms through which fiscal 
decentralisation is thought to influence economic growth. In 
Section 4, we provide a summary of the empirical evidence 
while Section 5 concludes. 
 
2. Fiscal decentralisation:  a summary 
 
In many instances what an author means by „fiscal 
autonomy‟, „fiscal decentralisation‟, „fiscal federalism‟ and 
„fiscal independence‟ can be confusing as they are terms 
often used interchangeably. Failure to establish a 
consensus of terminology between academics, politicians 
and commentators does not bode well for attempts to 
achieve a consensus on substance! In this section we 
propose a consistent terminology for future reference. 
 
Fiscal decentralisation refers to the granting of fiscal 
powers and responsibilities to sub-central levels of 
government. In recent years, there has been a growing 
international trend towards fiscal decentralisation. In a 
survey of 75 countries, Ebel and Yilmaz (2002) found that 
all but 12 have embarked upon some form of fiscal 
decentralisation within the last decade. However, as 
discussed in Darby et al. (2003), there is no consensus on 
the appropriate form of fiscal decentralisation. Countries 
have chosen to differ not only in the extent of 
decentralisation but also in the particular expenditures and 
revenues which have been affected. 
 
Chart 1, provides a summary of the key types of fiscal 
structure which are in place in other countries. While fiscal 
centralisation and independence are largely self- 
explanatory, fiscal decentralisation is more complicated. 
 
Chart 1: Fiscal structures: 
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As identified in Darby et al. (2003), historically, fiscal 
decentralisation has centred upon government 
expenditures. A primary economic justification for 
expenditure decentralisation is the belief that by tailoring 
the supply of public goods to local tastes and 
circumstances, improvements in allocative (consumer) 
efficiency can be obtained; the „decentralisation theorem‟, 
Oates (1972). 
Sub-central government expenditures can be financed from 
two sources; intergovernmental transfers (i.e. central 
government grants) or „own-source‟ revenues (i.e. 
revenues generated and raised within the respective 
constituency). Economists refer to this latter method as 
revenue decentralisation. As discussed in IMF (1997), 
every country in the OECD adopts a mixture of both grants 
and revenue decentralisation. 
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Grants can take the form of block transfers (i.e. a lump-sum 
allocation with no strings attached), specific transfers 
(grants specifically allocated for a certain purpose, e.g. free 
school meals) or matching transfers (top-up revenues for a 
particular purpose). Typically, grant finance offers little 
revenue autonomy for sub-central governments and this 
feature can be criticised for fuelling a dependency culture – 
see The Economist (2006) and Hallwood and Macdonald 
(2006). Grants do however provide an important fiscal 
equalisation mechanism in terms of regional revenue 
raising capabilities and in the face of asymmetric shocks 
across regions. 
 
The Scottish Parliament‟s reliance upon grant finance is 
balanced to a certain degree by substantial expenditure 
autonomy. As pointed out by Ebel and Yilmaz (2002), 
centrally imposed targets, guidelines and minimum 
standards significantly reduce the de-facto autonomy of 
sub-central governments. The lack of such central 
directives in the Scottish case is largely unrivalled in the 
OECD. However, the lack of revenue autonomy is also 
extreme. As discussed in Darby et al. (2002), no other sub- 
central government with comparable levels of expenditure 
responsibility has such little revenue authority. 
 
We decompose the second category, revenue 
decentralisation, into 2 further categories, fiscal federalism 
and fiscal autonomy. 
 
We define fiscal autonomy as a situation whereby all or the 
vast majority of sub-central revenues, are controlled 
independently by sub-central legislatures. Importantly and 
in contrast to grants, which require transfers from the 
centre to the sub-centre, fiscal autonomy implies a transfer 
in the opposite direction in respect of payment toward 
national public goods such as defence and foreign affairs. 
In its truest form, fiscal autonomy implies no national fiscal 
equalisation mechanisms both in terms of inter-regional 
transfers and national automatic stabilisers. Stabilisation 
policy is the sole responsibility of the sub-central 
government. In this scenario, the degree of sub-central 
autonomy, accountability and incentive effects will be at 
their highest. 
 
We define fiscal federalism as a combination of limited sub- 
central revenue autonomy coupled with a degree of central 
government control
2
. This sub-heading can be further 
divided into tax devolution, revenue assignment and tax 
sharing. 
 
Tax devolution involves the granting of responsibility for 
certain taxes, such as income or property taxation to sub- 
central governments while the centre retains control over 
the remaining taxes. In most countries, with devolved 
taxes, sub-central governments are typically free to set 
either the tax rate or base, subject to centrally imposed 
guidelines. The remaining vertical imbalance is financed by 
grants. An important issue is the selection of taxes to 
decentralise. In practice, there are few „good‟ sub-national 
taxes. A “good” tax system is one that provides for equity, 
limits distortions, is cheap to collect, is income elastic and 
generates a stable source of funds. As argued by McLure 
(1995), in order to satisfy these principles, most taxes are 
best left centralised and those that can be decentralised 
generally yield only small amounts of revenue. 
 
With revenue assignment, sub-central governments receive 
the entire amount of revenue collected within their 
jurisdiction but have no control over the setting of the tax 
rate or base. Control is instead retained by the centre. With 
full or even partial revenue assignment, sub-central 
politicians face strong incentives to boost the tax 
base/economic growth within their jurisdiction. Policies and 
innovations which improve the tax base within their region 
(for example policies which encourage inward migration, 
innovation, foreign direct investment, business creation etc) 
increase the revenues they receive. On the other hand, 
policies which harm the tax base lead to a reduction in 
revenues. Against this however, the degree of equalisation 
and insurance is relatively limited
3
. 
 
Tax sharing occurs when two or more tiers of government 
split the total national tax yield from a particular tax
4
. For 
example, a national (UK wide) income tax whereby the 
central government (Westminster) receives 75 per cent of 
the total tax returns within a region and sub-central 
governments (Scottish Parliament) the remaining 25 per 
cent. „Overlapping‟ or „piggy-back‟ taxes are also common, 
especially in Scandinavia. Here sub-central governments 
are permitted within limits to revise the tax rate set by the 
centre
5
. 
 
With tax sharing it is possible for central governments to 
retain at least some horizontal equalisation between rich 
and less well off regions and stabilisation remains largely a 
central responsibility. At the same time, by allowing sub- 
central control over taxation at the margin, tax sharing can 
provide positive incentive effects. Furthermore, the 
considerable role played by the centre in such systems 
maintains the prospect of central government involvement 
during asymmetric regional shocks, though to a lesser 
degree than under centralisation or grants. 
 
 
3. Fiscal decentralisation and economic growth: 
the theory 
More than a decade ago, a leading authority on fiscal 
decentralisation Wallace Oates argued “there is no 
formalised theory of a relationship between fiscal 
decentralisation and economic growth”
6
. Unfortunately, this 
situation has not changed! 
 
It is important to realise that fiscal decentralisation itself 
does not improve or hinder economic growth. Instead, 
fiscal decentralisation influences the fiscal and political 
environment within a region and through this channel it 
ultimately feeds through to regional/national growth. 
Surprisingly, despite its political importance, there has 
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been only limited formal analytical analysis of the 
relationship between fiscal decentralisation and economic 
growth although it has become a fast developing area of 
research in recent years. 
 
In this section we identify and discuss the key avenues 
through which fiscal decentralisation is thought to influence 
economic growth. 
 
Regional economic policy and dynamic allocative efficiency 
In the regional economic development literature, two 
important strands of thought have risen to prominence in 
recent years: endogenous growth and new economic 
geography models. Endogenous growth models (EG) 
stress that investment in physical and human capital 
together with technological progress has the potential to 
fuel sustained periods of economic growth (Aghion and 
Howitt (1998)). At the centre of the new economic 
geography (NEG) (Krugman 1991) is the belief that the 
concentration of economic resources and activity is also 
endogenous with businesses choosing to locate in areas 
where there are specific agglomeration benefits, such as 
transportation links, networks, economies of scale and a 
skilled labour pool. Both EG and NEG theories stress the 
importance of government activity and policies in shaping 
decisions and ultimately economic outcomes. Growth and 
economic concentration within a region is influenced not 
only by direct fiscal policies such as the tax environment 
and the presence of subsides, but also by policy outcomes 
such as the education and skills possessed by the local 
workforce. 
 
It follows that fiscal decentralisation has the potential to 
boost economic growth by granting sub-central politicians 
the opportunity to shape the regulatory framework, the 
taxation environment and the supply side of the economy 
to exploit any comparative advantages of the region, to 
address any specific skills shortages, to build upon and 
correct any infrastructure strengths and weaknesses and to 
encourage agglomeration in particular industries. In 
contrast, a uniform „one-size fits all‟ policy cannot perform 
such tasks
7
. Potentially, these effects can be significant. 
For example, Brueckner (2005) demonstrates that 
countries with different endowments between regions have 
the potential to ceteris paribus develop at a faster rate 
under fiscal decentralisation than fiscal centralisation. 
 
In the context of Scotland, these arguments imply that 
despite the Executive‟s considerable supply side 
expenditure remit, without control of taxation or the 
regulatory environment, the full range of fiscal powers, and 
arguably the most important ones, cannot be used to 
advance the Scottish economy. From this perspective, 
greater fiscal decentralisation has the potential to improve 
economic growth in Scotland
8
. 
 
However, by forcing sub-central governments to be more 
self-sufficient, fiscal decentralisation, especially on the 
revenue side, will necessarily place less well off and/or 
more remote regions at a disadvantage vis-à-vis resource 
rich regions when competing for investment, job creation 
and new business start ups. Sub-central governments 
within less well off regions naturally have a smaller 
resource endowment to finance public investment and to 
offer subsidies and they have less elbow room to cut 
taxation. Therefore, faced with an inability to compete with 
larger regions, fiscal decentralisation may harm 
disadvantaged regions and lock them into permanently 
lower levels of economic development. The success of 
Ireland, a relatively small economy on the periphery of the 
EU, would suggest that such disadvantages can be 
countered. 
 
 
Lower taxation 
A particular facet of the fiscal decentralisation debate in 
Scotland concerns the link between taxation (primarily 
corporation tax) and economic growth. It is important to 
note that increased revenue decentralisation in whatever 
guise and lower taxation are two distinct policies. An 
Executive with the power to alter corporation tax rate may 
choose to increase taxation. Furthermore, given Scotland‟s 
estimated fiscal position it is debateable whether a cut in 
corporation tax could actually be financed without 
significant cuts in public services. 
 
A lower corporation tax rate in Scotland relative to the rest 
of the UK has the potential to boost economic growth by 
not only increasing the profitability of companies already 
located in Scotland but also, and arguably more 
importantly, encourage outside businesses to relocate to 
Scotland. Economists generally believe that corporation tax 
rates that are too high reduce incentives to take risks, 
discourage businesses to accumulate capital and 
discourage individuals and organisations to engage in 
entrepreneurial activity
9
. 
 
Within a regional context however, it is difficult to 
accurately assess the potential impact of a reduction in 
corporation tax on one region‟s economy, without taking 
into consideration the spill-over effects on the rest of the 
country and more importantly, the reaction of central and/or 
other sub-central policymakers. Counterfactual policy 
analysis in such instances is inherently difficult. For 
example, in response to a reduction in the Scottish 
corporation tax rate, the UK government, faced with the 
potential relocation of businesses from England, Wales and 
Northern Ireland to Scotland may choose to follow suit by 
lowering UK corporation tax or increase subsidies and tax 
breaks. This would erode the potential competitive 
advantage effects and the anticipated boom in the Scottish 
economy. In general, economists have often been 
concerned about the possible negative effects of regional 
tax competition and the development of a Bertrand „race to 
the bottom‟; a self-defeating strategy of spiralling tax cuts 
as each sub-central government tries to undercut their 
rivals - see for example, Wilson and Wildasin (2004). 
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Competitive federalism: efficiency, accountability and policy 
innovation 
In spite of concerns over harmful tax competition, fiscal 
competition between sub-central governments does have a 
number of positive aspects which may boost economic 
growth. By opening up sub-central governments to 
competition for valuable resources with other regions, fiscal 
decentralisation can improve public sector efficiency. 
Ceteris paribus, inefficient governments will be less 
successful in attracting investment and enterprise and 
residents faced with the choice to locate within a number of 
jurisdictions will „vote with their feet‟ (Tiebout (1956)) and 
locate in constituencies which provide their favoured 
allocation of public good efficiently. Furthermore as 
discussed by Oates (1999), in an effort to obtain an 
advantage over their rivals, fiscal competition can 
encourage sub-central governments to actively search for 
innovations in the production and supply of public goods, 
potentially reducing costs and improving quality. This 
process, known as „laboratory federalism‟, can generate 
positive spill-over effects with the duplication of successful 
policy innovations and rejection of less successful ones. 
Improved public sector efficiency not only has the potential 
to boost short-run economic growth but by freeing up 
resources previously employed in less efficient tasks it can 
fuel long-term economic growth. Finally, by bringing 
government closer to the people, de Mello and Barenstein 
(2001) argue that both political accountability and 
monitoring of government performance are higher under 
fiscal decentralisation and the greater likelihood of „good‟ 
policies to promote economic growth and development. 
 
A number of economists question the validity of such 
arguments. Tanzi (2001) and Prud‟homme (1995) dispute 
the claim that efficiency and accountability are higher at the 
sub-central level arguing that central governments in 
general attract politicians of higher quality and competence 
while Rodden and Rose-Ackerman (1997) argue that local 
protectionist interest groups wishing to limit external 
competition often dominate at the regional level. Besley 
and Coate (2003) and Stumpf (2002) argue that contrary to 
the concept of „laboratory federalism‟, policy innovation 
may be lower under decentralisation than centralisation. 
Both papers argue that faced with uncertainty of re- 
election, risk-averse sub-central governments have an 
incentive to free-ride on policy innovations, mimicking the 
performance of their contemporaries for fear of providing a 
level of service lower than that of another jurisdiction. 
Consequently, this „yardstick competition‟ reduces the level 
of innovation in a decentralised setting. 
 
The empirical evidence on these issues fails to favour one 
side of the argument. In practice, measuring government 
efficiency, political accountability and policy innovations is 
extremely difficult. The most developed branch of this 
literature has been the exploration of a link between fiscal 
decentralisation and government size. The „Leviathan 
hypothesis‟ as suggested by Brennan and Buchannan 
(1980) argues that horizontal and vertical competition 
among different tiers of government will punish politicians 
who run inefficient and by implication large governments 
and therefore, one should expect to observe a negative 
relationship between fiscal decentralisation and 
government size. The empirical evidence is however mixed 
and some studies have even found evidence of a positive 
relationship, i.e. fiscal decentralisation is associated with 
larger governments – see Oates (1999) for a survey. 
 
Overall, the link between fiscal competition and economic 
growth is unclear. The effects, if any, are most likely to be 
keenly felt in Federal countries with a large number of 
competitive sub-central governments and not within the 
UK. 
 
Political incentives 
Another possible link between fiscal decentralisation and 
economic growth is through the positive incentive effects of 
growth promotion within a particular region. In general, 
grants provide few incentives to promote economic growth, 
and in fact, grant systems based upon „needs assessment‟ 
criteria can provide opposite incentives; Midwinter (2002). 
The reliance upon grants to finance current expenditures is 
arguably the greatest weakness of the current fiscal 
arrangements in Scotland. Hallwood and MacDonald 
(2006) argue that the Scottish Executive face few direct 
incentives to boost economic growth in Scotland “since the 
benefits of that improved growth, in terms of increased tax 
revenue, accrue to the exchequer in London”
10
. Ashcroft et 
al. (2006) argue that the political system will act as a 
sufficient incentive mechanism; if voters demand higher 
economic growth they will vote for it. However, in reality, 
aiming for economic growth is likely to be less politically 
popular than socially attractive alternatives. Without an 
explicit link between government actions and revenues, 
politicians are shielded to a certain degree from taking 
tough political decisions. With grants, the budget constraint 
faced by sub-central governments is not as strong as that 
faced under systems of greater revenue decentralisation. 
While the budget constraint is tight in the sense that total 
spending is fixed by the amount of grants allocated by the 
centre, there is no incentive to spend less than that level. 
This hypothesis, known as the „fly-paper effect‟ is 
supported by strong empirical evidence (see Hines and 
Thaler (1995) and Rodden (2002 & 2003)) and suggests 
that sub-central fiscal policy may not be efficient if financed 
by grants. Furthermore, with shared responsibility for 
economic development, it is often easy for politicians to 
blame poor outcomes on the „other‟ tier, see Anderson 
(2006). From the perspective of a voter in Scotland, who is 
responsible for the performance of the Scottish economy, 
Westminster or Edinburgh? Fiscal autonomy, where 
accountability is much more obvious has the potential from 
this perspective, to be more efficient. 
 
In addition to these potential positive effects of fiscal 
decentralisation on economic growth, the literature also 
identifies a number of potential shortcomings and it is to 
these we now turn. 
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Single Market Distortions 
Perhaps the most obvious negative effect is the potential 
for fiscal decentralisation especially revenue 
decentralisation, to distort the workings of the national 
single market. We argued above that diversified fiscal 
strategies may improve economic growth. However 
different regulations, tax rates and subsidies may 
themselves erect barriers, segment the national economy 
and raise costs for businesses operating on a national 
level. Such policies would also appear to work against the 
growing trend of the harmonisation of economic policies at 
an international level. 
 
Policy Externalities 
In practice, policies implemented by one particular sub- 
central government can have significant spill-over effects 
(i.e. externalities) on other regions. For example, 
investments in transportation infrastructure within one 
particular region will reap benefits for consumers and firms 
in surrounding regions and investments in human and 
physical capital will benefit the nation as a whole. Welfare 
economics suggests that faced with such positive 
externalities there will be an under provision of such goods 
relative to a centralised policy setting. Sub-central 
governments tend to focus only on the internalised benefits 
rather than the overall national benefits. Therefore, policies 
which fuel economic growth at the national level, such as 
investments in human and physical capital and research 
and development, will tend to be underprovided in a 
decentralised setting – see Wilson (1999). Similarly, 
policies that generate negative spillovers will be 
overprovided. The implication being that by myopically 
focussing upon regional effects, national economic growth 
and ultimately regional growth will be lower in a 
decentralised framework. While such externalities 
undoubtedly exist in the current fiscal framework, without 
appropriate remedial action one can expect these to 
increase in line with the level of revenue decentralisation. 
 
Macroeconomic Instability 
One of the greatest concerns with higher levels of fiscal 
decentralisation is the possible impact on macroeconomic 
stability. Macroeconomic stability is widely thought to be an 
important pre-requisite for economic growth – see Barro 
and Sala-i-Martin (2003). 
 
Fiscal decentralisation, by limiting both the economic and 
political authority of the central government, necessarily 
reduces the instruments available at the centre to protect 
the economy from unforeseen shocks. In addition, sub- 
central governments have fewer incentives and/or 
possibilities to act counter-cyclically, especially in a co- 
ordinated fashion. Sorensen et al. (2001) and Wibbels and 
Rodden (2005) find that in heavily decentralised countries, 
sub-central revenues and total budgets tend to be highly 
pro-cyclical over short and medium term horizons and 
therefore fail to provide stabilisation. Even without „shocks‟, 
there is no guarantee that the policies of respective tiers of 
government are consistent with one another. For example, 
one tier may favour fiscal expansion while the other, fiscal 
contraction. Triesmann (2002) argues that during periods 
of adjustment or economic reform such policy conflicts can 
be costly. However, using a dataset of OECD countries we 
show in Darby et al. (2005) that fiscal decentralisation has 
not necessarily limited the ability of a country to implement 
successful fiscal reforms. 
 
Finally, in practice sub-central governments often face a 
„soft-budget constraint‟ in that they realise that any 
significant structural fiscal imbalance will ultimately be 
financed by a central government handout with the cost of 
such a „bail-out‟ shared across the nation as a whole. The 
fiscal crises in Argentina and Brazil were largely due to this 
moral hazard behaviour. Rodden and Wibbels (2002) found 
that countries whose sub-central governments rely heavily 
upon central transfers are more likely to run larger deficits 
and have higher inflation rates than in countries with 
greater sub-central autonomy. This result suggests that the 
current fiscal arrangement in Scotland may in fact be less 
favourable for macroeconomic stability than a system of 
greater revenue decentralisation. 
 
Fixed Costs 
There are fixed costs involved with running and controlling 
sub-central governments. Costs such as increases in Civil 
Servants together with possible increases in bureaucracy 
and red-tape probably mean diverting resources from more 
productive tasks. For example, different taxation rates in 
Scotland relative to the rest of the UK would require a 
different administrative setup to identify and collect taxation 
to be allocated to each particular tier of government. Fiscal 
policies which involve significant economies of scale will be 
provided less efficiently in a decentralised setting which in 
turn can divert valuable resources to less productive and 
growth enhancing tasks. 
 
 
4. Fiscal decentralisation and economic growth: 
the empirical evidence 
It is clear from the above discussion that from a theoretical 
point of view the direction and the size of the relationship 
between fiscal decentralisation and growth is ambiguous. 
Ultimately therefore, the issue is an empirical one. In recent 
years there have been a number of empirical studies which 
have examined the impact of fiscal decentralisation upon 
economic growth. 
 
Unfortunately, a major weakness in virtually all the existing 
empirical studies is that they lack formal links to the theory 
discussed above. The standard approach has been to 
estimate cross-country or country case study regressions 
of national growth either via an empirical endogenous 
growth model following Barro (1990) or a neo-classical/„ad 
hoc‟ empirical growth model of the form used in Mankiw et 
al. (1992). After controlling for standard determinants of 
economic growth such as initial income levels, population 
growth, human capital stocks and capital investment, the 
effects of fiscal decentralisation are assessed through the 
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inclusion into these growth equations of some quantitative 
measure of sub-central fiscal power. 
 
By focussing on these simple regressions no inference is 
possible on the channels through which fiscal 
decentralisation impacts on economic growth. Moreover, 
many of the channels theory identifies as potentially linking 
decentralisation with economic growth involve roles for 
human capital investment, technological progress and 
private capital investment which are themselves included 
as conditioning variables in the growth regressions. 
Consequently it is difficult to appropriately attribute the 
direct effects of fiscal decentralisation on economic growth. 
A more appropriate methodology would be to focus on the 
various transmission mechanisms directly using measures 
of policy innovation, macroeconomic stability, human 
capital investment and so forth. One attempt to move in 
this direction is Thieβen (2003) who assessed the impact of 
fiscal decentralisation on capital formation and productivity 
in the OECD. While he found no significant relationship, 
this study is an important first step toward an improved 
empirical methodology. 
 
Nonetheless, even without explicit identification of any 
transmission mechanisms it is useful to assess whether a 
clear consensus emerges from the existing empirical 
studies. It has been common to estimate cross-country 
and/or panel data regressions. In addition to using annual 
data, some authors have in an attempt to capture long run 
effects estimated 5 and 10 - year averages (for example, 
Davoodi & Zuo (1998) and Woller & Phillips (1998)). 
Estimation techniques have been relatively standard with 
country fixed and time fixed effects used to control for 
country/region specific time invariant characteristics. 
 
From the cross-country studies, Davoodi & Zou (1998), 
Woller & Phillips (1998), Matinez-Vazquez and McNab 
(2005) and Feld and Dede (2005) all failed to find evidence 
of a significant relationship between fiscal decentralisation 
and economic growth. In fact, Davoodi & Zou (1998) found 
evidence of a significant negative relationship in developing 
countries, that is, greater fiscal decentralisation is 
associated with lower economic growth. In an effort to 
capture the impact of recent decentralisation reforms, Iimi 
(2005) re-estimated this relationship using data only for the 
late 1990‟s and found significant evidence of a positive 
relationship; that is fiscal consolidation is associated with 
higher economic growth. However, the sensitivity of this 
result which was based upon a very short time span (4 
years) is questionable. 
 
There is similarly no strong message in results from 
individual country studies. Initial results from Zhang and 
Zou (1998) for the effects of decentralisation in China 
pointed to an apparent significant negative relationship. 
However, when re-estimating the relationship using Zhang 
and Zuo‟s dataset and an improved econometric 
methodology, Jin et al. (2005) found evidence of a 
significant positive relationship. A similar significantly 
positive relationship is reported in Lin and Liu (2000). For 
the US, Xie et al. (1999) found no significant relationship 
but Akai and Sakato (2004) and Stansel (2005) both found 
evidence of a significant positive relationship. However to 
be more precise, Akai and Sakato (2004) only found a 
significant positive relationship between expenditure 
decentralisation and economic growth. Revenue 
decentralisation and revenue autonomy were found to have 
an insignificant impact on regional growth in the US. The 
results of Stansel (2005) should also be treated with 
caution as the measure of decentralisation is not strictly 
speaking the extent of fiscal decentralisation but the 
number of governments within an area
11
. 
 
While there are clearly a whole host of possible 
explanations for the lack of consensus including 
differences in estimation methods, sample periods, control 
variables and measures of fiscal decentralisation used, it is 
clear that the existing empirical literature does not provide 
unequivocal evidence of a strong relationship between 
decentralisation and economic growth in either direction. 
Unfortunately, this lack of consensus currently sheds little 
light on the fiscal debate in Scotland. 
 
In addition, these studies suffer from a number of 
weaknesses which again suggests caution should be taken 
against putting too much faith in a particular set of results. 
By relying upon budget data as a measurement of fiscal 
decentralisation, the aforementioned studies often fail to 
take into account the various dimensions of fiscal 
decentralisation. Consequently, the classification of 
countries according to their degree of decentralisation is 
often highly inaccurate. As mentioned above, most studies 
measure fiscal decentralisation as the percentage of total 
government expenditure or revenue spent/raised at the 
sub-central level
12
. However, an accurate measure of 
decentralisation would take into account a range of factors 
such as: 
 
i.  The extent of expenditure decentralisation 
ii. The „type‟ of expenditures devolved 
iii. The reliance upon intergovernmental transfers 
and  grants 
iv. The nature of these transfers (i.e. lump-sum vs. 
specific grants) 
v. The extent of central government targets and 
directives 
vi. The extent of revenue decentralisation 
vii. The degree of revenue autonomy 
viii. The structure of the tax system and extent of tax 
sharing 
ix. The extent of autonomy with „overlapping‟ and/or 
devolved taxes 
x. The degree of sub-central government borrowing 
autonomy 
xi. The degree of sub-central political autonomy 
 
An additional weakness with most of the aforementioned 
empirical studies is that they do little to establish the 
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direction of causality. In practice it is useful to ask, „Does 
fiscal decentralisation lead to higher economic growth?‟ or 
„Does higher economic growth lead to greater fiscal 
decentralisation?‟ Bahl and Linn (1992) have argued that 
economic development facilitates fiscal decentralisation 
and that there is a relatively high threshold level of 
economic development at which fiscal decentralisation 
becomes attractive. Such a threshold level can be 
explained not only with the fixed costs of decentralisation 
but also by the fact that at a relatively low per capita 
income level, the demands for public goods and services 
may be concentrated on very few goods and have a small 
variance. Thus at a low-income level it may not be difficult 
for a central government to have all information necessary 
to make the right decisions regarding local public goods. 
With economic growth, Bahl and Linn argued that the 
demands for public goods and services will likely increase 
as will their variance. As the preferences of people become 
more heterogeneous the demand for fiscal decentralisation 
increases. From this perspective, economic development 
comes first while fiscal decentralisation follows and this 
may explain the recent trend toward greater 
decentralisation especially in developing and transition 
countries. Failure to account for endogeneity biases the 
empirical results and the true effects of fiscal 
decentralisation on economic growth will not be accurately 
captured. Matinez-Vazquez & McNab (2005) tested for 
endogeneity, however the test they used suffers from a 
well documented low power. Iimi (2005) attempted to 
account for endogeneity by employing Instrumental 
Variables, however the instruments used (lagged values of 
the independent variables) do not fully circumvent the 
problem. By failing to properly address this issue of 
endogeneity it is questionable how much faith one can 
place in the empirical literature. 
 
 
Furthermore, most empirical studies test for the existence of 
a linear relationship between decentralisation and 
economic growth. In reality, it is far more likely there will be 
an „optimal‟ level for each country (depending on various 
economic, political and social factors). As argued by 
Thieβen (2003), a country may have „too much‟ or „too little‟ 
fiscal decentralisation and a „medium‟ level of 
decentralisation may be more appropriate. Thieβen (2003) 
found strong support for a „hump-shaped‟ relationship 
between expenditure decentralisation and economic 
growth suggesting that moving from a highly centralised 
system could bring significant benefits initially but that 
beyond a particular threshold of decentralisation, these 
benefits are lost. However, the econometric methodology 
used by Thieβen is relatively crude and the robustness of 
these results is as yet unclear. An additional limitation with 
current cross-country studies is that by focusing on 
measures of national economic growth they have ignored 
the spatial impacts of fiscal decentralisation and whether 
certain regions benefit more than others. 
Finally, the applicability of these studies to the Scottish 
case is questionable and one should be careful not to 
attach too much weight to their findings. For example, in 
most cases decentralisation is measured only in terms of 
the level of expenditure decentralisation. In contrast, the 
debate in Scotland now centres on revenue 
decentralisation and revenue autonomy
13
. Furthermore, 
studies of the experience of single countries have focussed 
on Federal countries such as the USA which have quite 
different fiscal and political institutions, laws, sizes of sub- 
central authorities and preferences. Moreover, no country 
has yet implemented a system of full sub-central fiscal 
autonomy and therefore it is impossible to fully ascertain 
from empirical evidence the likely impact of such a reform 
in Scotland. In essence, using existing studies to infer the 
likely impact of revenue decentralisation in Scotland 
involves extrapolating the interpretation of their empirical 
results beyond breaking point. 
 
To summarise, it is difficult to ascertain the extent to which 
the existing empirical literature can inform the fiscal 
decentralisation/fiscal autonomy debate in Scotland. Before 
a definitive conclusion can be reached more robust 
empirical evidence taking into account the nuances of the 
Scottish case should ideally be sought. 
 
 
5. Conclusions 
It is clear that fiscal decentralisation can influence economic 
growth in a number of directions. On the one hand the inter-
governmental competitive environment, coupled with the 
granting of fiscal and economic powers to sub-central 
governments who are then able to shape policy to best 
capture the subtle distinctions of their jurisdiction, can 
create efficient and dynamic regions with substantial 
improvements in economic growth. However, to the extent 
that poorer regions are put at a disadvantage and 
competition generates negative spillovers between regions, 
fiscal decentralisation may harm economic growth. 
 
Unfortunately, the current empirical literature does not tell 
us which effect dominates. Studies that have tested for 
correlation between fiscal decentralisation and economic 
growth have for the most part provided conflicting results 
lacking in robustness. Moreover, it is questionable how 
much one should trust the results in the empirical literature 
as they generally lack theoretical foundations and suffer 
from a number of significant data and methodological 
limitations. The failure to explicit test the mechanisms 
through which fiscal decentralisation can contribute to 
economic growth is a significant weakness of this literature 
and must be addressed. 
 
 
In summary, while the theoretical research indicates that 
there are links between fiscal decentralisation and 
economic growth it is unclear whether an extension of the 
current devolved fiscal arrangements in Scotland would 
bring about the desired long term economic effect. 
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Endnotes: 
1 
There are many other alleged advantages and disadvantages of 
fiscal decentralisation such as improving voter participation and 
social capital. However, the goal of this paper is on the relationship 
with economic growth 
2
In the US, fiscal federalism refers to the broad topic of finance for 
sub-central governments. 
3
Since certain revenues are retained at the centre there is the 
potential that these could be used for equity and stabilisation 
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purposes but overall this will be less significant than under a grants 
system. 
4
See Roy (2006) for a survey of the extent of tax sharing 
arrangements in EU countries. 
5
The „Tartan Tax‟ in Scotland is an example of a „piggybacked‟ tax. 
6
Oates (1993) 
7
While it is theoretically possible that a central 
government could vary fiscal policy across regions, 
economists usually argue that this is unlikely. In practice 
they are likely to suffer from 
informational disadvantages and political constraints which 
prevent them from doing so. 
8
Note, such an outcome does not necessarily require fiscal 
autonomy. Greater tax devolution or overlapping taxes also 
provide the opportunity for the Scottish Executive to alter 
revenues in Scotland in an attempt to boost economic 
growth. 
9
Lee and Gordon (2005) found that based on the experiences of 
70 developed and developing countries, a cut in the 
corporate tax rate of 10 per cent can on average be 
expected to increase annual economic growth rate by 
nearly 2 per cent. 
10
Hallwood and Macdonald (2006) pp. 14-15. 
11
For example, the number of governments in Scotland 
increased after the re-organisation of local authorities in 
1996 but the level of fiscal decentralisation remained 
constant. 
12
An exception to this is Stansel (2005) who uses a measure of the 
number of governments. 
13
This is important when interpreting the results of the work of Akai and Sakato (2002) for example 
